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Abstract 
Debiasing procedures are experimental methods aimed at correcting errors 
arising from the cognitive biases of the experimenter. We will discuss two of 
these methods, the predesignation rule and randomization, showing to what 
extent they are open to the experimenter’s regress: there is no meta-rule to prove 
that, after implementing the procedure, the experimental data are actually free 
from biases. We claim that, from a contractarian perspective these procedures 
are nonetheless defensible, since they provide a warrant of the impartiality of the 
experiment: we only need a proof that the result has not been intentionally 
manipulated for a prima facie acceptance.  
  
1. Debiasing Procedures and the Experimenter’s Regress1 
The epistemology of experimental error often draws on repertoires of error-
correction methods used across different disciplines (e.g., Franklin 2002, 6). In this 
paper, we are going to discuss a class of methods used in different experimental settings 
in order to correct errors arising from the experimenters’ cognitive biases. We will name 
them debiasing procedures.  
The so-called confirmation bias provides an instance of the sort of error these 
procedures aim at correcting: this bias refers to the “unwitting selectivity in the 
acquisition and use of evidence”, i.e., the agent selects evidence in order to confirm one 
particular belief or hypothesis, although she does not intend to do it in a biased way and 
does not realize that she is doing so when it happens. Confirmation biases have been 
well documented by psychologists in a diversity of contexts (Nickerson 1998), 
including scientific research. Kevin Dunbar and his team, for instance, have shown how 
laboratory scientists actually use “Known standard'' control conditions with a view to 
correct for confirmation biases: these controls involve “performing the experimental 
technique on materials where the expected result is already well known; if the expected 
result is obtained, the scientist can have confidence that the procedure is working” 
(Baker & Dunbar 2000, 345). This way, researchers do not trust their feelings about the 
correction of data, where confirmation biases may arise, but make a decision on the 
basis of an external check. These control conditions constitute an instance of what we 
call a debiasing procedure. 
In general, debiasing procedures are experimental methods aiming at preventing 
the contamination of the experimental result by the preferences of the experimenter 
regarding this latter. In this paper, we will discuss in some detail two of them: the so-
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called predesignation rule and randomization. The former prescribes that tests should 
be designed before experimental data are obtained, so that the experimenter does not 
choose the most convenient test for his own interests. The latter is an allocation 
procedure used in experiments where two treatments are compared, preventing any 
systematic connection between the preferences of the experimenter and the treatment 
assigned to each participant. 
In this paper, we will discuss debiasing procedures in connection with a well-
known problem in the epistemology of experiments, the so-called experimenter’s 
regress (Collins 1981). In the case of debiasing procedures, this regress would be the 
impossibility of establishing in a mechanical fashion if the procedure has actually 
worked, if the experimental result is actually free from biases. Hence, we would 
ultimately depend on the experimenter’s expert (but subjective) judgment to decide 
whether the data are actually unbiased. But how do we know if this latter judgment is in 
itself bias-free? The experimenter’s regress puts thus in question the epistemic 
justification of experimental results. Scientists would accept these latter on less 
objective grounds than philosophers tend to think.  
 In section 2, we will discuss the possibility of an objectivist solution to the 
experimenter’s regress on debiasing procedures, drawing on the error-statistical analysis 
of the predesignation rule developed by Kent Staley and Aris Spanos. We will show that 
there is indeed a potential experimenter’s regress in our debiasing procedures, because, 
as of today, we ignore the causal mechanisms by which biases are generated. We try to 
correct them, so to speak, blindly. Given this uncertainty, in section 3, we argue for a 
contractarian justification of our debiasing procedures: scientists would be justified in 
accepting a debiased experimental result not because we are certain about its efficacy in 
each particular case, but rather because the implementation of such procedures 
  
guarantees the impartiality of the experiment. I.e, they prevent any intentional 
manipulation of the data, so that, in the long run, as experiments are replicated, they 
make more likely that the true outcome will be observed, independently of the biases of 
the experimenters involved.  
The role of methodological norms as warrants of impartiality has been mostly 
emphasised by the contractarian approach and in this paper we want to present a formal 
argument showing how this approach overcomes the experimenter’s regress in the case 
of debiasing procedures such as randomization (section 4). We claim that, from an 
epistemic perspective, experimenters only need to agree on which methods can 
impartially control their biases in order to justify any experimental result they obtain, 
even if the experimenters cannot establish in an objective manner in each case whether 
their results are actually bias free.  
2. An Objectivist Solution to the Experimenter’s Regress 
An objectivist solution for the experimenter’s regress would be one in which we 
would check for the biases of our data in a purely procedural fashion, without room for 
subjective judgment. The most promising approach in this respect today is the error-
statistical philosophy of evidence developed by Deborah Mayo (1996). Instead of just 
drawing on a “hodgepodge” of methods aimed at correcting experimental errors, Mayo 
wants to formally establish the probability that a given test detects an error when it 
actually occurs. Within this approach, there are two alternative views as to the 
justification of debiasing procedures, depending on whether we take them as warrants of 
the objectivity of our statistical model or we require instead built-in assumptions on the 
effects of experimental biases in this latter.  
Kent Staley (2002, 2004) provides an illustration of the more “moderate” 
approach in his discussion of the so-called predesignation rule in physics experiments. 
  
According to this debiasing procedure, all the relevant features of a test procedure 
should be predesignated in advance of any examination of the data. This is a rule of folk 
statistics (Mayo), generally accepted in physics without a clearly argued rationale. 
According to Staley, the underlying intuition is that our testing procedures can make a 
difference to the sampling distribution of the experiment (Staley 2002, 282), impinging 
on our assessment of the severity of the test. But, as the following experiment 
illustrates, physicists sometimes violate this rule.  
In the 1990s, an experiment was conducted in the Collider Detector at Fermilab 
with a view to establishing the existence of the top quark. Millions of particle collisions 
were measured with a view to isolating “candidate events” revealing the sought-after 
top quark. After collecting the data, the threshold values of the measurements defining a 
candidate event (the so-called cuts) were changed. The results were nonetheless 
published (not without discussion among the authors) and accepted.  
From an error-statistical perspective, this is clearly an objectionable procedure: 
when we test a hypothesis with a given significance level, we assume that our 
experimental data are just an instance of a series of infinite repetitions of the experiment 
as it has been originally designed. As Aris Spanos (2010, 567) puts it, we “embed the 
material experiment into a statistical model viewed as a purely probabilistic construct”. 
The statistical distribution captured in this model () formally defines a legitimate 
event in the experiment as a typical realization of (). A test of : 	 ≤
		versus	: 	 ≥ 	 in a Neyman-Pearson framework is just an analysis of the true 
  
distribution of the sample ∗() according to the experimental data: were these data 
generated by () or rather by its complement () relative to ()?2 
In the Fermilab experiment, the significance of the obtained data was not 
calculated taking into account that the cuts defining a candidate event had been 
redefined in order to increase the value of the test statistic. The assumption was that the 
sampling distribution () constructed for the original threshold value would not 
change with the new cut.  
 Staley (2002, 288) captures the statistical rationale of the predesignation rule 
through the concept of the homogeneity of a reference class: 
A reference class A used in calculating the probability of an outcome E is 
homogenous with respect to E only if there is no factor B, under the control of 
the experimenter and present in that instance of the experiment that resulted in 
E, such that p(E|A)≠ p(E|A&B). 
In the Fermilab experiment, the reference class of candidates events A is defined 
for the original threshold through () and the factor B is the intervention of the 
experimenter to redefine the threshold, after seeing the experimental data E. The 
assumption made by the experimenters with the new cuts is precisely that p(E|A)≠ 
p(E|A&B). 
The predesignation rule, so conceived, is clearly a debiasing procedure: it aims 
at preventing the contamination of the experimental data by the subjective preferences 
of the experimenter. In the Fermilab experiment, we want to make sure that the 
threshold is not defined in a self-serving manner according to the preferences of the 
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experimenter regarding the existence of the top-quark. If the experimenter believes in 
the top-quark, she should not set the threshold for detecting it after seeing the data, 
because she may recognize is existence “too easily” (if she falls prey to a confirmation 
bias). Staley claims that the predesignation rule can be justified, in an error-statistical 
perspective, because it is generally unfeasible to calculate a probability distribution for 
tests in which the experimenter’s preferences intervene. We cannot estimate the effect 
of these preferences on the outcome. We can only choose whether to believe or not the 
experimenter if she claims that her intervention did not have any effect in the outcome. 
Hence, we will justify the predesignation rule as a means to protect the objectivity of 
 –more precisely, the homogeneity of the reference class. 
Aris Spanos provides a more radical approach to debiasing rules, in which Staley 
justification turns out to be not objective enough. According to Spanos, biases affect 
evidence “through the distortion of the relevant error probabilities” stemming from the 
data generating mechanism captured in ()3. Evidence in an error-statistical 
perspective should be objective: we should control the generation of the data by 
checking the assumptions of (). Debiasing procedures such as the predesignation 
rule are neither necessary nor sufficient for getting reliable data. As the Fermilab 
experiment could illustrate, if the existence of the top quark is confirmed through other 
means, we can get reliable data without applying the rule. And even if we apply the 
predesignation rule, the data might have been contaminated by the preferences of the 
experimenter in a different way we were not controlling for. Evidence in an error-
statistical perspective should be objective: we should control the generation of the data 
through the model () that purportedly captures the data generating mechanism, 
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rather than through any debiasing procedure, whose implementation is necessarily 
subjective. 
Were we able to identify the causal mechanisms generating biases in our data, 
the best conceivable solution would be indeed to incorporate such knowledge into our 
model in order to verify whether our results are actually bias free. The main problem 
here is that psychology is still far from giving a definite answer to the causal 
mechanisms underlying biases: even in the best studied cases, such as the confirmation 
bias mentioned in the introduction, we seem to have an umbrella concept covering a 
family of experiments dealing with selectivity in the use of evidence with many 
potential accounts of its sources. This is why Staley’s justification of the predesignation 
rule as a means to protect the objectivity of our models of the experiment seems to us 
more cogent: given the uncertainty about the way in which the experimenter’s 
preferences may affect the impartiality of the tests, it seems wise to sever all ties 
between both (which is what the predesignation rule does). 
However, Staley’s approach does not solve the experimenter’s regress as such –
and in this respect Spanos is right: we can only be certain of the homogeneity of the 
reference class to the extent that there is no factor under the control of the experimenter 
that may change the statistical distribution assumed in the model. But how do we know 
that no such factor has been manipulated in each particular set of results we obtain? For 
instance, if a scientist finds one of these latter against his own interests (e.g., in seeing 
his own hypothesis succeed), he may always contest the result claiming that the 
homogeneity of the reference class has been violated. In our view, the epistemic 
justification of any debiasing procedure should provide an answer to this last problem. 
Our agreement on these procedures should be strong enough to resist any self-serving 
use of the experimenter’s regress in order to promote the particular views of any 
  
scientist. The contractarian approach that we will present in the next section provides, 
we believe, the best justification of such an agreement. 
3. A Contractarian Approach to a Debiasing Procedure 
Let us introduce the contractarian approach through an analysis of a much 
debated debiasing procedure: randomization, particularly as it is used in clinical trials in 
medicine. In these latter, once a patient is deemed eligible (according to the trial’s 
protocol) and recruited, a treatment is assigned at random. Depending on the 
arrangement of the trial (number of treatments, whether or not it is double blinded, 
whether or not it is multi-centre), randomization may be implemented in different ways. 
The general principle is that each patient should have an equal probability of receiving 
each treatment. In cases where it is convenient to control the allocation of treatments 
according to patient characteristics, in order to prevent imbalances, randomization can 
be stratified. 
From a purely statistical standpoint, randomization is justified for the 
contribution it makes to significance testing (e.g., Basu 1980). But, independently of 
this, experimenters usually adopt randomization as an allocation procedure in order to 
avoid selection biases: it prevents investigators from assigning (consciously or 
unconsciously) patients with, say, a given prognosis, to any one of the treatments. For 
instance, an investigator might allocate the experimental treatment to the healthier 
patients, if she wants the trial to be positive, or to the patients with a worse prognosis, if 
she thinks they will benefit more. This is an argument that never fails to appear in 
medical textbooks. 
We should distinguish here between the procedure and the outcome of 
randomization: procedurally, it is a warrant of experimental fairness in the sense of 
preventing the manipulation of the treatment allocation; however, it might happen that 
  
the allocation obtained is nonetheless biased. By sheer chance, a random allocation may 
yield an unbalanced distribution of the two treatments, i.e., the test groups may differ 
substantially in their relevant prognostic factors (these are called baseline imbalances). 
This difference may bias the comparison between treatments and spoil the experiment. 
If one such distribution is observed, the customary solution is to randomize again 
seeking a more balanced allocation. Ultimately, the judge of this balance is, of course, 
the experimenter. This is a well-known source of Bayesian objections against 
randomization as grounds for significance testing4. It is not so often noticed that it also 
constitutes a clear instance of the experimenter’s regress, this time about debiasing 
procedures: even if randomization is procedurally fair, its outcome can only be declared 
unbiased according to the skills of each particular experimenter, without an external 
standard to confirm it.  
Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch (2005, 84-110) illustrated this regress (with 
another form of selection bias) in their analysis of the trials of vitamin C as a cure for 
cancer. The therapeutic use of vitamin C was originally proposed by Linus Pauling, 
following his conjecture on the failure of the cellular mechanisms as the ultimate cause 
of a number of diseases (the common cold, mental deterioration associated with age, 
etc.). A Scottish physician, Ewan Cameron, developed this conjecture and started 
experimenting with cancerous patients in the early 1970s with apparently positive 
results in a study with matched historical controls. After a few years of controversy, 
Cameron’s study was replicated at a bigger scale at the Mayo Clinic in a randomized 
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trial with negative results. Interestingly both parties accused each other of improperly 
debiasing their studies: for the Mayo researchers, there has been a selection bias in 
Cameron’s original study, by which only patients with less severe forms of cancer had 
been treated; for Cameron and Pauling, in turn, there was evidence that the patients at 
the Mayo study had violated the trial protocol, ingesting more vitamin C than the 
prescribed dose. Accusations of scientific fraud flew. All parties claimed to have the 
proper skills to test the therapy, but these claims could not be tested experimentally. For 
the Mayo team the controls on patients (random urine analysis of their vitamin C levels) 
had been good enough because the dosage of the treatment was not as important as for 
the Cameron team. For this latter, conversely, the Mayo team had failed to select the 
type of patients who could benefit most from the therapy. The controversy never came 
to a formal end (Jenkins 2004, 14-35). 
The experimenter’s regress is one of the strongest arguments for the 
sociologists’ claim that experiments are closed not on the basis of purely epistemic 
considerations, but rather on a non-epistemic bargaining between self-interested agents. 
Experiments alone do not settle scientific controversies once and for all. Perhaps they 
would if there were unlimited resources for research and we could exhaust all the 
possible sources of controversy with further experiments. But since there are no such 
resources in our world, experimental evidence α will be inescapably conditioned by the 
sort of non-objective considerations that most philosophers of science want to avoid: α 
will be evidence for an agent X “only because of the influence of some non-epistemic 
factors Y.” 
If we want to overcome the experimenter’s regress, we need to justify 
randomization on a procedural basis, not just on the grounds of its outcome. This might 
seem somewhat paradoxical, since we usually expect scientific procedures to be 
  
acceptable on the basis of their results alone. If randomization did not yield unbiased 
results often enough, there would be no reason to allocate treatments at random. The 
problem at which the experimenter’s regress points out is that we do not have a clear 
criterion to distinguish in particular cases when a randomized allocation is actually free 
from biases. Hence, we would lack an objective reason (in the sense of Spanos) to 
accept its outcome. 
In our view, there is an objective epistemic reason to accept a randomized 
allocation, despite the uncertainty about its particular outcomes. We need to explain 
under which circumstances randomization constitutes a better allocation rule than any 
other alternative procedure for assigning treatments in a comparative experiment. The 
problem that the experimenter’s regress opens is that the uncertainty about the fairness 
of a randomized outcome can be exploited for purely private purposes if the decision 
depends on the tacit skills of the experimenter alone. It might happen that we accept as 
legitimate an experimental result whose methodological grounds are shaky just because 
the outcome favors the interest of the experimenter. In our view, the virtue of 
randomization is that even if the outcome is occasionally biased, this will never happen 
in the interest of the experimenter. Further replications might show that an experimental 
result was erroneous, but this will happen precisely because debiasing procedures such 
as randomization prevent any systematic intervention to alter the result according to 
anyone’s particular interests.  
This intuition can be substantiated from the standpoint of the epistemic 
contractualism promoted by Jesus Zamora (2002, 2006; Ferreira & Zamora 2006). 
Zamora’s major claim is that even a community of self-interested scientists would have 
incentives to adopt good methodological standards. A researcher seeking to increase her 
professional reputation can only succeed if her peers accept her results. So even if every 
  
one of them has an incentive to promote the methodological rule most favourable to her 
own theory, they need to agree on a set of standards. Chances are that, if this agreement 
takes place before their actual research starts, they will choose standards a priori neutral 
regarding their particular interests. We may deem these rules impartial to the extent that 
they warrant “a satisfactory gain to anyone in a wide set of conceivable circumstances” 
(Zamora 2002, 305), i.e, impartiality does not imply absolute disinterestedness: 
scientists are allowed to pursue their own private goals, provided that they play by the 
methodological rules they have agreed. Indeed, the normative force of these rules stems 
exclusively from their self-interested agreement: they are not universally valid 
principles, even if we may expect that the negotiation captures epistemic intuitions that 
can pass as such.  
Whereas for Popper it was merely a conventional decision which statements we 
take as basic evidence for testing a theory, in Zamora’s contractarian approach we can 
justify this decision in terms of agreed evidence-gathering norms. Scientists need to 
decide in advance what counts as legitimate evidence in order to avoid the “temptation” 
of contesting someone else’s discovery (e.g., for lack of data or signficance) in order to 
maximize their own chance of making it themselves. In this spirit, we can interpret a 
formal argument developed by D. Berry and J. Kadane (1997) in order to show, from a 
utilitarian perspective, why two self-interested scientists would agree on randomization 
as an allocation procedure, independently of their statistical creed.  
 We have a situation in which scientist A will test a given hypothesis about the 
efficacy of a drug on the data gathered in a clinical trial by scientist B. Scientist A does 
not know whether it is better to trust the individual judgment of B in the allocation of 
treatments to patients or rather to use some “mechanically objective” device, such as 
randomization. In the scenario of scientific competition assumed in the contractarian 
  
approach, scientist A will want to prevent that B manipulates the allocation, consciously 
or unconsciously, biasing the results in his own benefit. And so would B, if the situation 
was reversed. This is why they would agree to randomize the allocation on a purely 
procedural basis: even if the result is unbalanced, they cannot contest the fairness of the 
experiment. In order to rationalize this intuition, let us present a more analytical picture 
of the situation drawing on Berry & Kadane (1997). 
We have n patients: n1 receive treatment 1 and n2 treatment 2. Let Xi = 1 if 
patient i is a success and Xi = 0 if patient i is a failure. Let ti be the treatment that patient 
i received 
Suppose there is a covariate hi, representing the general health of the patient –
where hi = 1 if the patient i is healthy and hi = 0 otherwise. Let pjk be the probability that 
a patient is a success under treatment j with covariate hi, where k = 0, 1. If someone has 
to assign treatments to patients and perceives that pj0 is different than pj1, she may feel 
tempted –for whatever reason– to do the allocation on the basis of the covariate. 
Let w be the proportion of the population of patients that is healthy. The goal of 
the study is the estimation of the probability that a patient is a success under a given 
treatment. Since the health of the patient may affect the treatment’s outcome, let us 
represent the probability that a random selected patient from the population is a success 
under each treatment as follows: 

∗ =  +	(1 − ) 

∗ =  +	(1 − ) 
  
If we ignore the existence of the covariate hi, the sufficient statistics for 
estimating ∗ and 	∗are: 
̂ =
∑  !!:"!#$
%$
, ̂ =
∑  !!:"!#&
%&
 
As '( → ∞, ̂( → +(, = 1|. = /) for j = 1, 2. 
But let us now calculate this last expression, +(, = 1|. = /), taking into 
account the possibility of allocating treatments according to the covariate. Let λ1 be the 
probability that a healthy patient is allocated to treatment 1 and λ0 the probability that an 
unhealthy patient is allocated to treatment 1. Therefore, the probability of a patient 
being a success conditional on receiving treatment 1 is now as follows: 
+(,0 = 1|.0 = 1)
= +(,0 = 1|.0 = 1, ℎ0 = 1)+(ℎ0 = 1|.0 = 1)
+ +(,0 = 1|.0 = 1, ℎ0 = 0)+(ℎ0 = 0|.0 = 1) 
 We can now calculate the probability of being healthy, conditional on receiving 
treatment 1 
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Therefore, 
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We can now compare the probability of a success with treatment 1 ignoring the 
covariate with the probability of success with the same treatment, taking into account 
the covariate. 
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 − )
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We see that ̂ will only provide a correct estimation of ∗ in the following three 
cases: 
(a) w = 0 or w = 1: the patients are all healthy or all unhealthy, there 
is no covariate. 
(b) p11 = p10: the covariate does not affect the result of the treatment. 
(c) λ1 = λ0 : healthy and unhealthy patients have the same probability 
of receiving treatment 1. 
Let us now return to the initial situation: scientist A has to choose an allocation 
rule to be used in the trial conducted by B. If, for whatever reason, A has a positive 
probability that there is such covariate (denying (a)) and that this covariate affects the 
probability of the treatment’s success (denying (b)), A should ask for the treatments to 
be allocated with equal probability to each patient in order to prevent any manipulation, 
i.e., the optimal allocation rule is randomization. With this, A maximizes its chances of 
getting a correct estimation of ∗	. And so would B if the situation was reversed. In this 
sense randomization would be a warrant of the impartiality of the trial, on which a 
procedural agreement (as an evidence-gathering norm) between competing scientists is 
possible. 
4. Randomization and the Experimenter’s Regress 
As we mentioned before, the main epistemic threat of the experimenter’s regress 
is that an expert makes a biased judgment over the legitimacy of a result. No debiasing 
procedure can guarantee indeed that is outcome is actually free from the biases it aimed 
at preventing. The question is thus why scientists with conflicting interests would agree 
on a purportedly debiased result. The contractarian approach argues that even the most 
self-interested researchers would have an incentive to agree on impartial procedures that 
prevent the manipulation of a result. As the case of randomization illustrates, these 
  
procedures provide the best chance for them of seeing the truth emerge with further 
replications of the experiment, without giving any of the competing parties an unfair 
advantage in proving its own hypothesis. 
An objectivist like Spanos may object to this understanding of randomization 
that it is still subjective (just as the predesignation rule), on the grounds that it depends 
entirely on an agreement on an experimental procedure, rather than on an actual analysis 
of the subsequent data. Indeed, if we knew every potential source of bias, we would be 
able to arrange alternative allocation procedures conditionalizing on them, just as 
Kadane & Seidenfeld (1990) suggest, controlling the whole procedure by purely 
statistical means. But the problem in clinical trials is that we are uncertain about the 
sources of bias that may interfere in the allocation. The virtue of randomization is that it 
guarantees that this uncertainty is not exploited by any competing scientist in his own 
interest, giving everybody an equal chance to see his own hypothesis succeed and, 
crucially, making it more likely that this is the true one –as the experiment is replicated. 
The contractarian solution to the experimenter’s regress is to implement 
debiasing procedures that make sure that the experiment is impartial, even if the 
outcome is sometimes not. In contexts where no objectivist alternative is available, we 
do not need more than a pre-commitment to these procedures to make an experimental 
result epistemically acceptable. 
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